Introduction Background
In the 1970's the idea of using constructive proofs of theorems as programs was advocated and studied theoretically [5, 23] . In the 1980's the computer science community started to experiment with this concept [4, 28] , and today there are several prototype systems that enable us to write programs in this way [9, 21, 6, 28, 11] . So for instance, from a constructive proof of the Intermediate Value Theorem, a system like Nuprl [9] can extract a program which computes the intermediate value to any precision required [7] .
I claim that we now know that this proofs-as-programs paradigm for programming really works for a certain class of specifiable problems whose solutions are sequential functional programs. Moreover, we know that this programming paradigm offers advantages over all others in cases where the explanation of the algorithm is very important and is being offered to people with a mathematical orientation. In fact informal mathematics over the centuries abounds with algorithms presented in just this way.
The method is noteworthy because it suggests ways of tackling certain problems basic to a mature theory of programming. For instance, the ordinary laws of a logic also provide those of a programming logic is built on it directly and simply. Furthermore the technology of automating mathematical reasoning applies immediately to reasoning about programs. Perhaps most critically, the methodology of mathematical problem solving which has been so much studied is applicable holus pollus to programming.
This includes knowing the foundations of the enterprize, knowing when and how to calculate both symbollically and numerically, and knowing how to present complex arguments in intelligible ways.
In this article, I will assume the statements made above and ask how we might improve this valuable programming paradigm. Certainly we can improve it by expanding its applicability to a wider class of specifiable problems, to a richer class of programs as solutions and to a larger scale of programming (say thinking of systems as theories).
This paper is concerned with just one of these topics, namely allowing a richer class of solutions. Infact we will examine the idea that classical proofs can be regarded as programs as well as constructive ones. This is not a very intuitive idea, it is counterintuitive in fact. It is made possible by expanding the programming constructs allowed in the underlying functional language.
The fact that classical proofs can be interpreted as programs in some cases is a surprizing discovery that did not arise by simply exploring the engineering issues systematically. It is the result of a scientific discoveries made by Griffin and Murthy [19, 25, 26, 10] . It has led the community to a line of research that was unknown before, a line which may have ties to the several other investigations which aim to gradually broaden the scope of the paradigm [17] .
Overview of the paper
The paper begins with a discussion of type theory. This is the logical system in which the proofs-as-programs paradigm will be explored. We could have used a simpler logic such as higher-order number theory. But the amount of work involved in explaining that theory is not appreciably less than what we will do here, and it is one of my secondary goals to present the elements of constructive type theory. So the details of how the type theory is presented will be of independent interest. The next section discusses programming in type theory. We will see that the programming part looks a lot like a functional programming language with rich types such as Standard ML [20, 24] ; already at this point we can appreciate the value of using type theory as opposed to other formalisms.
In section 4 we examine how logic is defined on top of the type theory. Here we invoke the well-known propositions-as-types principle, and we define the sublogics of constructive and classical arithmetic (so-called Heyting and Peano arithmetics respectively).
In section 5 we examine program derivation from specification. Then in section 6 we expand the programming language to include the control operators of Felliesen [12] . This is the programming basis for the extension of the logic in section 7 to interpret classical proofs computationally.
Core Type Theory Informal basis
We are attempting to speak of mathematical objects. We think of them as mental constructs created by the process of imagination. A particular method of constructing objects corresponds to a class or type. Objects do not exist before hand in some Platonic world, instead they are created by carrying out constructions in accordance with a method. On this view the types are specified before the objects in them. Among the objects we consider are methods of construction themselves or algorithms. My colleagues and I have noticed a systematic way to present a notation for objects that is adequate for the type theories we know. We can limit these forms without apparently limiting the algorithms for manipulating objects. The basic form of a expression in this theory is the term. Every term is of the form op(v 1 
We say that op is the operator name,v i is a list of binding variables, and t i is the i − th subterm which is exactly the scope of the binding variables the precede the dot separating them from the term.
A Simple Type Theory
Here is a small type theory that serves for the basic results needed in the rest of the paper. The basic syntactic concept is a term. 
Abbreviations
We sometimes write ap(f ; a) as f (a) and λ(x.b) as λx.b. This is the "standard notation" for lambda terms [3] , and we use it in any long examples or in standard ones.
We write f (< x, y >) sometimes as f (x, y) and more generally f (<< x, y > z, >) as f (x, y, z). We also write n + 1 for succ(n). 
Typing rules

Semantics
Just as in the lectures we adopted a semantic approach to type theory, so at this point we do not give an enumeration of the rules which embody the ideas just described concerning reduction of terms (which become computation rules), the formation of types (which become formation rules) and the conditions for membership in types (which for the canonical terms become introduction rules and in the case of the noncanonical terms become elimination rules). A complete set of rules can be found in [9] .
In the lectures at Marktoberdorf the semantic methods of Stuart Allen [1] were used as a rigorous basis for this semantic approach. But due to space limitations here we merely cite Allen's work and proceed informally since there is no need to use the rigorous approach for the results stated in this article. 
λs. while(s; bexp; body) = f ix(λw. λs. if bexp(s) then s else w(body(s))fi)
Here is how we express an iterative program to find the integer square root r of n.
λx.λr. while(r; λy.(y
This is essentially the program r := 0; while(r + 1) 2 ≤ x do r := r + 1 od which is one way to compute the root. Next we look at another program for this.
Primitive recursion
In general if n+1 denotes the successor of n, succ(n) then primitive recursive functions are defined as
It is more convenient in a higher order setting to write this as
A further simplification is to write both clauses in a single "linear" expression and recognize that the recursive call is always to f (n) so that expression can be written 
Logic in Type Theory
Propositions-as-Types Principle
Propositions are the material of logic. They can be defined in type theory. One precise mechanism for doing this was pieced together by Curry, Howard, and deBruijn (and perhaps others as well as, say Lauchli). It is sometimes called the Curry-Howard isomorphism or the propositions-as-types principle and is related to Brouwer's notion that logic is not a subject prior to mathematics but is part of it.
1
Although these ideas were formulated for constructive mathematics, we now know that they are interesting for classical mathematics as well [10, 26, 16, 8] , and indeed this paper is concerned with exploring this aspect.
The basic idea is this. For a large class of propositions P there corresponds a type, say [P ], which is inhabited if and only if P is true. Thus,
We can think of the inhabiting element, p, as evidence for the truth of P . One interpretation of this notion of evidence will be developed below as we define the types corresponding to atomic arithmetic propositions.
We begin exploring the correspondence by building it up for the atomic propositions of number theory, starting with those parametized by a variable x which are true if and only if x is zero. The types corresponding to this proposition we denote by Zero(x).
We want a type expression in x which is inhabited if and only if x is zero. Notice that Since there is some element of N, 0 = 0 corresponds to an inhabited type. Since there is no element of void, 1 = 0 corresponds to an empty type.
It might be more elegant to have some unit type, say unit, inhabited by some token like * . Then ind (x; unit; u, i.void) would be a simpler type corresponding to x = 0. We would have
But there is no other need for this extra type. So we settle for using N as our standard inhabited type. This type theory builds logic on a principle that identifies propositions and types.
Principle The propositions x = 0 are defined by the type ind(x; N ; u, i.void). We abbreviate these as Zero(x).
So for each natural number x, Zero(x) is the proposition that x is zero. This is the definition of the proposition. We say that Zero(x) is a predicate in the variable x, and
Let us next define the propositions that x equals y in the integers. 
λ(z.eq(monus(z)))(y).
We will be able to prove these simple properties of the defined equality.
4. Equal(x,y) and Equal(y,z) implies Equal(x,z)
6. For no x is Zero(succ(x)) true.
These are enough properties to give us Peano's axioms for equality.
In Nuprl and Martin-Löf type theory certain atomic propositions are built in. For example x = y in N is a primitive predicate and 0 = 0 on N is a primitive proposition.
Its inhabitant is called axiom. Likewise x < y is a primitive in Nuprl, and its true instances are inhabited by axiom as well. Sometimes in the text we will use axiom in this way when we do not care to look into the structure of these simple propositions.
Compound Propositions
The proceeding discussion might make it appear that the correspondence between propositions and types is a highly artificial matter depending on properties of the natural numbers. In fact the correspondence is far more general and profound. It was discovered first by Curry in the realm of the propositional calculus. We will look at this next. Notice first the situation for the false proposition, say false, or as it is sometimes written nowadays, bottom, ⊥. The right type corresponding to ⊥ is void. 
If we write these combinators as lambda terms and type them, we will see that the typing derivation corresponds exactly to a proof of the corresponding propositions.
Let us do that for S.
End Now compare this type checking to the following proof. 
Logic
Types
If we think of ∃x : A.B as a generalized +, it suggests these rules:
Logic Types a A B[a/x] ∃x : A.B a : A b : B[a/x] < a, b >: prod(A; x.B) Proving ∀x : A.(B(x) ⇒ ∃y : A.B(y)) is like building λ(x. λ(y. < x, y >)) in f un(A; x.f un(B(x); prod(A; y.B(y))))
Logic Types 
H, x : A, B(x) G H, ∃x : A.B G E, x : A, y : B(x) g : G E, z : prod(A; x.B(x)) spread(z
Defining Classical Logic
The embedding of logic into type theory given in the previous section applies only to constructive or Intuitionistic logic, but it can be extended to classical logic using the methods of Kolmogorov and Gödel. Here is Gödel's definition of the classical connectives.
Definition 3 If P and Q are formulas, and A is an atomic formula, then
(A) G = A (P & Q) G = P G & Q G (P ⇒ Q) G = P G ⇒ Q G (∀x : N.P ) G = ∀x : N.P G (P ∨ G) G = ¬(¬P G & ¬Q G ) (∃x : N.P ) G = ¬∀x : N.¬P G If H = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) then H G = (P G 1 , . . . , P G n ).
Gödel proved the following theorem which gives a translation of Peano arithmetic (P A) into Intuitionistic arithmetic (called Heyting arithmetic, HA).
Theorem 2 (Gödel) If formula F is provable from hypotheses H in Peano arithmetic
This theorem shows that we can express all of the concepts of Peano arithmetic in our type theory. We can be explicit about using the classical connectives if we introduce the following definitions. Proving the first fact provides explicitly a witness for x whereas proving the second might not give the witness explicitly. (We will see in section 7 how to recover the witness from proofs of the second formula.)
Program Derivation
As an aside before getting to the main topic, notice that the decide operator provides a more flexible way to define while loops. Given an expression Bexp(s) for which we know
Bexp(s) ∨ ¬Bexp(s), say this is decided by bexp(s), then we could define a while loop as λ(s. while(s; bexp; body))= f ix(λw.λs. decide(bexp(s); t.w(body(s)); f.s)).
We now have sufficient expressiveness to precisely state the integer root problem.
Given any n of type N we seek a number r such that
That is, we are looking for an additional inhabitant of
We can prove this theorem in several ways. One of them corresponds to building the while loop and another to building the primitive recursive program. We sketch both of these. The first one requires that we develop in type theory a notion of iteration and iterative construction of proofs.
One way to prove any proposition R(n, r) that requires finding r is to build up r interatively from some initial value; say in the example above starting r at 0 and increasing it by one until R(n, r) holds.
Sometimes the proposition R(n, r) can be factored into some decidable part, say Bexp, and some part, called the invariant, say I(n, r) such that:
¬Bexp(n, r) & I(n, r) ⇒ R(n, r) and
I(n, r) ⇒ Bexp(n, r) ⇒ I(b(n, r))
where b(n, r) produces a pair of values (say n , r ).
We might need to assume something about the initial conditions on n and r expressed as a precondition, say P re(n, r). We expect to have
P re(n, r) ⇒ I(n, r).
The process of producing new values from n and r, say it is the function whose value is b(n, r), must be known to finally achieve the desired end. This can be guaranteed by termination conditions. For example, if we know
Bexp(n, r) ⇒ ¬ T (0, n, r), I(n, r) & Bexp(n, r) & T (t, n, r) ⇒ T (t − 1, b(n, r)), then we know that eventually repeated application of b will result in Bexp(b(n, r))
becoming false.
The while induction theorem will be formulated in terms of "states." The simplest state is just an n-tuple, say s A 1 × · · · × A n . The goal formula is written G(s), the precondition is P re(s), the invariant is I(s), the termination condition is T (n, s), and the body is body(s).
Let us define the invariant condition as:
∀s.State. ((P re(s) ⇒ I(s)) & (I(s)&¬Bexp(s) ⇒ G(s)) &
I(s) ⇒ Bexp(s) ⇒ I(body(s)))
and the termination condition as:
body(s))).
We need to mention pieces of the invariant condition, so let initial(s) be P re(s) ⇒
I(s) and let post(s) be I(s)&¬Bexp(s) ⇒ G(s) and let proof-body be the function λ(s. I(s) ⇒ Bexp(s) ⇒ I(body(s))
). These can be defined from the invariant condition.
We basically want to prove that under the above two conditions
The essence of the proof is that given s and a proof, pre of P re(s), s is given by
while(s; bexp; body). where bexp(s) Bexp(s) ∨ ¬ Bexp(s).
In order to iteratively build up the proof term for G(s ) we define an iteration form on proofs called whilep
whilep(s; i; bexp; b; p) = if bexp(s) then i else whilep(b(s); p(i)(bexp(s)); b, p) fi.
This can be defined straight forwardly with the f ix operator. We could have incorporated while and whilep into one form if we included proof information in the state.
Here is the theorem.
While-induction:
For 
whilep(s; initial(s)(pre); bexp; body; proof−body))))))
We can also derive the primitive recursive program for root from the following inductive proof that a root exists. It is not a simple term, but we are not concerned with this part of the proof so we leave the term undefined.
Notice that this is essentially the primitive recursive program of section 3.2
Evaluation
Purely functional programming is not as efficient as we would like. For example, suppose we are multiplying an array of numbers. A typical functional program for this, expressed iteratively (as defined in section 3) is:
where a : {x : N |1 ≤ x ≤ n} → N is a definition of an array. Given a tail recursive evaluation strategy, this evaluates as efficiently as an imperative program on a state.
But if some of the array elements are zero, then we would like to stop the computation.
A first try might be the loop
But this does not actually save steps unless we can stop the execution early. In an imperative language we could write the loop as
The exit statement stops evaluation of the loop. The exit statement is a control statement, like a goto. In the functional setting the role of such statements is taken over by control operators. These are operations which appear as functions in expressions, but then evaluation involves a change in the normal order of evaluation. These are discussed in [25, 12, 15] .
Here is a version of the program with a control operator: To specify the evaluation of a control operator, we can use reduction rules as in Definition 2, but now it is necessary to be precise about the context in which a reduction takes place because the control operator C can change that context.
In general a fixed evaluation strategy, such as lazy evaluation, can be presented in two parts. The first is to locate the redex to be contracted (the subterm to be rewritten).
The second is to carry out the reduction of redex to its contractum. The first part can be specified precisely by noticing that it partitions any term into the redex and the Control operators can manipulate the context. To define C it is convenient to use an operator called abort (although abort can be defined from C see [26, 19] ).
Reduction Equation 1 E[abort(m)]ev→ m.
So an abort operation executes by throwing away its surrounding context and returning it argument as a value. Now the evaluation rule for control can be defined.
Reduction Equation 2 E[C(m)]ev→ ap(m; λ(x. abort(E[x]))).
This operator packages up the surrounding context and saves it for future use. The argument to C must be a function.
We can now use this rule to evaluate the program for multiplying the elements of an array. Suppose a specific array a and a specific value n is provided, then the outer level of the program is essentially
where bexp1, bexp2, and B are the obvious operations on s. 
This causes the while loop to begin executing. If at some point bexp2(s ) becomes true for some s , then there will be a context F at which the reduction is
When this reduces the result is just < 0, i >.
Typing
Let us now try to assign a type to the control operator. has type A → B.
Recall that E[C(m)] reduces to ap(m; λ(x.abort(E[x]))). Since E[C(m)] has type B,
we know that m must return values of type B. Moreover the input to m is of type
Thus we see that m has the type (A → B) → B. Since the hole has type A;
this means that C has the type
It does not make sense to think of C as the inhabitant of the propositions ((A ⇒ B) ⇒
A) since this is not logically true (we could prove any A with this). But it is a sensible inhabitant of the classically valid proposition
This interesting observation was made by Griffin [19] . But the computational value is unclear since it seems to apply only to values of type void, of which there are none! Chet Murthy [26] observed that Harvey Friedman's "trick" [14] for getting computational meaning from classical proofs is just what is needed to make computational sense out of the typing of C. Friedman's result is that in order to prove certain kinds of statements, S, namely of the form ∃n : N. R where R is decidable (i.e., a 0 1 formula), it suffices to prove (S → void) → void. In computing terms, this means that for some types S, in order to compute values of type S, it suffices to write functions that return values in void. This is the significance of Friedman's "top level trick."
Friedman's result suggests more since he shows how to use a classical law of logic to produce constructive results. The import of this is that operators like C make sense as part of the computation of values. In the case of proofs, it is a matter of investigation to know just which constructive results can be proved by classical means; so in the case of programs it is a matter of investigation to learn which computations using C produce the results we expect.
Friedman's result
To state Friedman's result we need to talk about the form of proofs and rules. For this we use sequent calculus in which proofs and rules are written in a top-down fashion, as in tableau. We write sequents as
where A i , G are formulas. The A i are hypotheses and G is the goal or conclusion.
Sometimes we abbreviate these as
H >> G
where H denotes a list of formulas as above.
A typical rule is modus ponens or implication elimination. We write it as H, (A ⇒ B) We need to call attention to the rule for treating a false hypothesis. For ease of writing, let ⊥ denote the proposition false (the type void is the same). Now the rule ⊥-elimination is just
That is, from ⊥ we conclude anything.
The negation of a formula B is defined as ¬B == (B ⇒⊥), and the A-negation of B, 
From P A we easily get a proof of ∃y : N. Spec(x, y).
Here is an example of the result first proved informally. Although this may seem too trivial to consider, the example makes interesting points. We show simply that Here is the proof obtained from the above argument which satisfies clause 1 of the theorem. We look at a formal proof for this which follows the informal argument above very closely. From this formal proof it is easy to build the inhabiting proof term. The goal is the formula ((∃x.¬¬(0 < x)) →⊥) →⊥ (as required by clause 1 of the theorem). This is proved by assuming (∃x.¬¬(0 < x)) →⊥>>⊥ is a subgoal.
Next the modus ponens rule generates the subgoal of showing >> ∃x.¬¬(0 < x) (the subgoal that ⊥ follows form ∃x.¬¬(0 < x) →⊥, ⊥ is omitted to save space). 
x(axiom >) >)
The method is to use Friedman's "top-level trick" which we now explain.
Notice that according to clause 2 of Friedman's theorem we have a proof of (∃x. 
Programming with Classical Proofs
We now consider programming in a language with the control operator C. We extend the evaluation rules for the language to include the ones for C and abort. For more results along these lines see [10, 26, 27] . As a final comment on this line of work let us see what the computational interpretation of P ∨ ¬P is. This can be proved from the law of ¬¬elim as follows. 
>> P ∨ P by inl P >> P hyp
The proof term for this proof is
C(λ(np. ap(np; inr(λ(p. ap(np; inl(p))))))).
This reduces to inr(λ(p. ap(λz. abort(z); inl(p)))).
This term acts like a proof of ¬P . It has the right type and is in normal form. But, if this term is ever applied in a proof, rather than just used as a value, then its input must be an object of type P , call it p o . When λ(p. ) is applied to p o the result is ap(λz. abort(z); p o ) which reduces immediately to p o throwing away the surrounding context. This is quite an interesting meaning for P ∨ ¬P . It is computational and it interacts with the other computational forms to preserve types in the sense of Murthy's theorem.
We need to know more general conditions on when this form preserves types and gives standard content. That is an excellent research topic.
